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INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, courts have not imposed strict liability on doctors and
hospitals for either defective instruments used during medical treatment or
defective, surgically implanted devices. This general rule rests on the finding
that health care providers are not "sellers" under section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,' a version of which most states have either
statutorily or judicially adopted.2 Courts instead treat doctors and hospitals as
primarily professional "service providers" and, therefore, generally hold them
exempt from strict liability statutes Likewise, health care providers are
typically not held liable for defective medical instruments and devices under
breach of statutory warranty or common-law implied warranty, both of which
apply exclusively to the "sale of goods."4
Defining health care providers as sellers of hypodermic needles and other
instruments used during medical procedures seems ludicrous, as clearly no
"sale" is involved-the patient neither bargains for the instrument nor assumes
possession of it. However, commentators have recently called into question
judicial reluctance to treat doctors and hospitals as sellers in cases involving
defective medical devices implanted or otherwise transferred during surgery. 5
Critics of the majority rule against strict liability for health care providers argue
that patients in fact purchase these devices through actual sale transactions. 6
This Note examines the implications of the South Carolina Supreme
Court's recent adoption of the majority rule that health care providers are not
strictly liable for defective medical devices or instruments, regardless of their

1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODucTs LIABILITY § 20 cmts. a, d & f
(Proposed Final Draft 1997) (explaining that despite the historical trend ofcourts to extend strict
liability beyond the manufacturer under section 402A, hospitals and doctors generally are not
considered sellers under section 402A).
2. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 98, at
694 n.l 1.5 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988).
3. Id. § 104, at 720.
4. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 204 (1981).
5. See discussion infra Part IV.
6. See discussion infra Part IV.
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nature. The court's June 1998 decision, In re BreastImplantProductLiability
Litigation (In re Breast Implant),7 rejects the contention that doctors and
hospitals sell the medical devices they surgically implant into patients, holding
that health care providers are not subject to South Carolina's strict tort liability
statute,8 to its expressed9 and implied warranty'" statutes, or to a common-law
warranty of soundness and quality." Part II of this Note summarizes the
holding ofln re BreastImplant;Part III details the national development of the
majority rule; and Part IV considers criticism of the rule's application to
transferred medical devices, with special attention to policy concerns. Finally,
Part V revisits the South Carolina decision in light of these criticisms.' 2
II. IN RE BREAST IMPLANT PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION
In June of 1998, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed a circuit court
order and held that "health care providers are not strictly liable under S.C. Code
Ann. § 15-73-10 for medical devices or instruments used in the course of
treatment of patients.'

3

The court further found that health care providers are

not liable under South Carolina's statutory adaptations of Uniform Commercial
Code Article Two warranties or under a common-law warranty of soundness
and quality.' 4 In March 1997, the court granted a petition for writ of certiorari
from the health care providers-referred to by the court as Healthcare

Defendants-despite the court's general practice of denying such writs for
matters that canbe resolved at trial or on appeal.15 The South Carolina Supreme

7. 331 S.C. 540, 503 S.E.2d 445 (1998).
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
9. Id. § 36-2-313.
10. Id. §§ 36-2-314 to -315.
11. In re BreastImplant, 331 S.C. at 553,503 S.E.2d at 452. The In re BreastImplant
court indicated that South Carolina does not recognize a common-law warranty ofsoundness and
quality in the medical context. See id.
12. The application of comment k of section 402A, which deals with unavoidably
unsafe products, to breast implants is outside the scope ofthis Note. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). For discussions of application of comment k, see Richard L.
Cupp, Jr., Sharing Accountabilityfor Breast Implants: Strict ProductsLiability and Medical
ProfessionalsEngaged in Hybrid Sales/Service Cosmetic ProductTransactions,21 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv.873,909-11 (1994); Rachel B. Adler, Comment, Device Dilemma: ShouldHospitalsBe
Strictly Liablefor RetailingDefective SurgicalDevices?, 5 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 95, 116-21
(1994); Emily C. Aschinger, Note, The Selling of the Perfect Breast: Silicone, Surgeons, and
Strict Liability,61 UMKC L. REv. 399, 414-15 (1992).
Likewise, this Note does not consider federal preemption ofclaims involving class III
medical devices under the Medical Devices Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic
Act of 1938. For discussion of preemption, see Adler, supra, at 112-16; Beverly L. Jacklin,
Annotation, FederalPre-emptionof State Common-Law ProductsLiability Claims Pertaining
to Drugs,MedicalDevices, and OtherHealth-RelatedItems,98 A.L.R. FED. 124 (1990 & Supp.
1998). The South Carolina Supreme Court did not address these issues in In re BreastImplant.
13. In re Breast Implant, 331 S.C. at 553, 503 S.E.2d at 452.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 543-44 & 543 n.2, 503 S.E.2d at 447 & n.2.
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Court agreed with the circuit court judge that the issues involved presented
"[n]ovel questions of law concerning issues of significant public interest that
are contained in numerous state and federal actions," and that a state supreme
court decision "would serve the interests of judicial economy by eliminating
numerous inevitable appeals raising these issues."' 6
The opinion, written by Associate Justice Jean H. Toal, is perhaps better
understood when read against the backdrop of similar cases that preceded and
informed the court's decision. By examining the line of cases that came before
In re BreastImplant,one can more fully comprehend the history of the court's
"essence of the transaction" test" and can better appreciate arguments of critics
who believe the majority-rule test yields unacceptable results when applied to
implanted medical devices."8
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MAJORITY RULE

In the landmark decision of Greenmanv. Yuba PowerProducts,Inc., 9 the
California Supreme Court unanimously adopted an alternative to negligence
and breach of warranty actions for holding manufacturers and merchants
liable-a new theory that imposed less stringent requirements on the plaintiff.20
The court held the defendant manufacturer liable for injuries its defective
product caused, despite the plaintiff's failure to meet the notice requirement for
a breach of warranty action, by 2finding the manufacturer accountable under the
theory of strict liability in tort. '

Soon after Greenman, the American Law Institute adopted section 402A

16. Id. at 543-44 n.2, 503 S.E.2d at 447 n.2.
17. See infra notes 48-76 and accompanying text.
18. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
19. 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1962) ("A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an
article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.").
20. See KEETONETAL., supranote 2, § 98, at 692 ("It gradually became apparent that
strict liability on 'warranty' concepts ... carries far too much luggage in the way of undesirable
complications, and is more trouble than it is worth.").
21. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 900 ("The notice requirement.., is not an appropriate one
for the court to adopt in actions by injured consumers against manufacturers with whom they
have not dealt"). The doctrine of strict liability in tort for defective products was first articulated
in Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440
(Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). In Escola Justice Traynor stated:
I believe the manufacturer's negligence should no
longer be singled out as the basis of a plaintiff's right
to recover in cases like the present one. In my opinion
it should now be recognized that a manufacturer
incurs an absolute liability when an article that he has
placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to human beings.
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of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.' Section 402A describes a method by
which plaintiffs may recover damages from manufacturers and sellers.
Plaintiffs may plead this cause of action in conjunction with or as an alternative
to actions for negligence or breach of warranty.'
The policy justifications for strict products liability underlying section
402A revolve around several core propositions.74 First, strict liability
proponents argue that those who manufacture and sell defective products can
best spread the costs of liability for defective goods through their ability to raise
prices, which allows consumers and sellers to share the costs of risk of injury
or damages. 5 Second, manufacturers and sellers are best positioned to discover
and prevent defects, and the threat of strict liability deters them from creating
and marketing defective products.26 Third, the consumer often relies on the
reputation, care, and skill of the manufacturers and sellers." And fourth,
negligence is often so difficult to establish that it results in wasteful litigation,
or is so costly to prove that it discourages plaintiffs from pursuing

22. Section 402A states:
(1)
One who sells any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a)
the seller is engaged in the business of
selling such a product, and
(b)
it is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold.
(2)
The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies
although
(a)
the seller has exercised all possible care in
the preparation and sale ofhis product, and
(b)
the user or consumer has not bought the
product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
23. KEETON ETAL., supra note 2, § 98, at 694.

24.

See Porter v. Rosenberg, 650 So. 2d 79, 81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 98, at

692-93; Cupp, supra note 12, at 876 n.20; John E. Montgomery & David G. Owen, Reflections
on the Theory andAdministrationofStrict Tort LiabilityforDefectiveProducts,27 S.C. L. REv.
803, 809-10 (1976); David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict ProductsLiability, 33
VAND. L. REV. 681, 684-85 (1980).
25. Porter,650 So. 2d at 81; KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 98, at 692-93; Cupp,
supra note 12, at 876 n.20; Montgomery & Owen, supra note 24, at 809.
26. Porter,650 So. 2d at 81; Cupp, supranote 12, at 876 n.20; Montgomery & Owen,
supra note 24, at 809.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965); Cupp, supra note 12,
at 876 n.20; Montgomery & Owen, supra note 24, at 809.
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compensation at all.28 Justice Traynor later elucidated the justification for
extending strict liability from manufacturers to distributors and sellers in
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,29 where the court held that "[r]etailers like
manufacturers are engaged in the business of distributing goods to the public.
They are an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that
should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products."3
These policy arguments stem from "[t]he fundamental purpose underlying
the doctrine of strict products liability": the furtherance of "public safety in the
use of consumer goods." 3' Each argument applies not only to strict liability in
tort, but also to breach of implied warranty (the two products liability causes
of action not requiring fault).
Almost immediately, courts nationwide began relying on Greenman and
section 402A to apply strict products liability. 32 South Carolina first recognized
the doctrine in 1974, when the legislature passed the Defective Products Act.33
Like the strict liability statutes of other jurisdictions, section 15-73-10 of the
Act codifies section 402A nearly verbatim.34

A. Strict Liability in Tort and Breach ofImplied Warranty Compared
As noted above, practical differences between an action for breach of
warranty and one for strict liability in tort exist.3 Plaintiffs suing under strict

28. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 98, at 693; Cupp, supra note 12, at 876 n.20;
Montgomery & Owen, supra note 24, at 809. Cupp notes that "[a]nother often stated rationale
for strict liability is that the price of a good should reflect its true cost to society, including the
cost of injuries which it causes." Cupp, supra note 12, at 876 n.20.
29. 391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964).
30. Id. at 171.
31. Porter,650 So. 2d at 81.
32. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 98, at 694.
33. S.C. CODEANN. §§ 15-73-10 to -30 (Law. Co-op. 1976);see F. PATRICKHUBBARD
& ROBERT L. FELIX, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 265 (2d ed. 1997). Strict liability in

tort was not part of South Carolina common law prior to the adoption of this section. Hatfield
v. Atlas Enter., Inc., 274 S.C. 247, 248, 262 S.E.2d 900, 901 (1980) ("[Ihe doctrine of strict
liability in tort, imposed as a result of a product's defective condition, did not emerge until Code
§ 15-73-10--§ 15-73-30 (1976) were enacted."); HUBBARD & FELIX, supra,at 266.
34. Section 15-73-10 deviates from section 402A only by omitting "thereby" in
subsection one and substituting "shall apply" for "applies" in subsection two. Section 15-73-20
of the Defective Products Act is entitled "Situation in which recovery shall be barred," and
provides: "If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and
nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred
from recovery." S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976). Section 15-73-30, entitled
"Intent of chapter," expressly incorporates the comments to section 402A as evidencing the
legislative intent of the chapter. Id. § 15-73-20. Furthermore, "since most jurisdictions have
judicially adopted some form of strict liability akin to section 402A, the decisions of their courts
can be helpful in interpreting the statute." HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 33, at 266.
35. See Dana Shelhimer, Comment, Sales-ServiceHybridTransactionsand the Strict
LiabilityDilemma, 43 Sw. L.J. 785, 789 (1989). This Note emphasizes the doctrine of strict
liability in tort and its applicability to health care providers because the South Carolina Supreme
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liability in tort need not prove reliance on the seller's judgment or

representation, and they need not notify the seller within a reasonable time after
injury.36 However, while section 402A prohibits recovery for pure economic
loss in the absence of personal injury or property damage, implied warranty
statutes generally permit recovery.37 On the other hand, plaintiffs suing under
an implied warranty theory cannot recover damages for claims such as
wrongful death. Also, claimants who merely suffer damage to their property
may be able to sue only under strict liability in tort because under implied
warranties sellers can disclaim liability for property damage.38
Despite these differences, the two causes of action overlap in terms of
theoretical justifications and goals. Although courts created strict products
liability to provide an alternative or additional remedy to those of negligence
and breach of warranty, most courts and commentators consider the theories
behind strict liability in tort and breach of implied warranty to be
interchangeable.39 Liability based on breach of warranty is, after all, closely
related to strict liability because it is based on contract; thus, fault need not be
established.0 Further, neither theory allows the manufacturer or merchant to
disclaim liability for personal injuries.4 When both causes of action are
claimed, courts almost always decide both claims the same way4' because the

Court's In reBreastImplantopinion clearly focuses on this issue. However, authority addressing
warranty claims is included throughout to support arguments concerning both warranty and strict
liability in tort. The In re Breast Implant decision includes warranty authority as support for
strict tort liability arguments, as do the decisions of most cases cited in this Note. But cf.infra
Part III.A (discussing the differences between warranty claims and claims for strict liability in
tort).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. m (1965).
37. Shelhimer, supra note 35, at 789.
38. Shelhimer, supra note 35, at 789 & n.38 ("Sellers of defective products cannot
disclaim liability for personal injury under § 402A or under implied warranties." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment m (1965) (strict products liability is not affected by
disclaimer....").
39. See, e.g., Herrick v. Monsanto Co., 874 F.2d 594, 598 (8th Cir. 1989) ("[T]here
appears to be little difference between the [breach of warranty and strict liability] theories, apart
from the warranty defenses of lack of notice, disclaimer, and perhaps lack of privity."); Kozup
v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1058 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that 'implied warranty
and strict liability in tort are but two labels for the same legal right and remedy,"' and because
their .'governing principles are identical' . . plaintiffs' two separate Counts may be viewed
together.") (quoting Cotton v. McGuire Funeral Serv., Inc., 262 A.2d 807,808 (D.C. Cir. 1970)),
modified, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988), affd, 906 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
63A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 935 (1997) ("Under the law of some jurisdictions,
warranty and strict liability are treated as similar or even identical concepts.").
40. See JAMES J.WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-7,
at 349-50 (4th ed. 1995) (calling the implied warranty of merchantability a "first cousin" of strict
liability and outlining the elements of a merchantability claim).
41. See supra note 38.
42. Cf.Daniel F. Ryan, III & Timothy R. Lawn, Strict LiabilityClaimsAgainstHealth
CareProvidersin BreastImplant Litigation,29 TORT & INS. L.J. 818, 824 (1994) (arguing that
"appellate courts would not create a body of case law holding that those who furnish medical
services are sellers of services under section 402A but merchants of goods under the Uniform

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

7

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 8
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. SO: 463

two theories share the same governing principles. 3
B. The ClassicSeller/Service ProviderDistinction and Hybrid
Transactions
Courts typically do not apply strict products liability to service providers. 44
Services are not considered "products" or "goods" and thus generally fall
outside the scope of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A and Uniform
Commercial Code section 2-213. 45 Moreover, those who provide services are
already subject to liability under negligence or theories of intentional
misconduct. 46
However, a problem arises when the services involve the use or transfer of
a defective product.47 In these so-called "hybrid" sales/service transactions, the
distinction between seller and service provider is not so clear. To facilitate this
classification, most courts expressly or implicitly apply the "essence of the

Commercial Code"). But see Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 734, 739 (N.Y. 1995)
(stating that strict products liability claims and breach of implied warranty of merchantability
claims are not correctly considered identical, and finding that a manufacturer may be held liable
under warranty and not tort). In Denny the court explained: "It is th[e] negligence-like
risk/benefit component of the defect element that differentiates strict products liability claims
from U.C.C.-based breach of implied warranty claims in cases involving design defects." Id. at
736.
43. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; cf. Morris G. Shanker, Strict Tort
Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary on
JurisprudentialEclipses,Pigeonholesand CommunicationBarriers,17 W. RESERVE L. REV. 5,
11 (1965) (comparing strict liability in tort with breach of warranty and arguing for a unified
system of products liability).
44. See David B. Harrison, Annotation, Application ofRule ofStrictLiability in Tort
to PersonorEntityRenderingMedicalServices, 100 A.L.R. 3d 1205, 1208 (1980 & Supp. 1998)
(noting the cases in which strict liability was held inapplicable to medical service providers).
45. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 40, § 9-2, at 331 ("By its own terms, Article
2 applies only to 'transactions in goods.' Code warranty provisions do not govern contracts
which are purely for services."); William C. Powers, Jr., DistinguishingBetween Productsand
Services in Strict Liability, 62 N.C. L. REv. 415, 419-20 (1984) ("[N]early all courts have
refused to extend strict products liability to pure service transactions.").
46. See Magrine v. Krasnica, 227 A.2d 539, 546 (Hudson County Ct., N.J. 1967)
(stating that service providers "'are not liable in the absence of negligence or intentional
misconduct') (quoting Gagne v. Bertran, 275 P.2d 15, 20 (Cal. 1954)), aff'dsub nom. Magrine
v. Spector, 241 A.2d 637 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968) (per curiam), aff'd, 250 A.2d 129 (N.J.
1969) (per curiam); KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 104, at 719.
47. In such situations, parties often do not dispute that the item involved is a product
for purposes of strict liability, and courts recognize causes of action against the product
manufacturer and distributors. See Porter v. Rosenberg, 650 So. 2d 79, 81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (breast implant); E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stickney, 274 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1973) (bone graft material). Rather, the question is whether a service providerwho supplies the
product qualifies as a seller.
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8

Pleicones: Passing the Essence Test: Health Care Providers Escape Strict Lia

1999)

STRICT LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL DEVICES

transaction" or "predominant factor" test ("Essence Test"). 48 In Bonebrake v.
Cox49 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit explained: "The test for
inclusion or exclusion is not whether [goods and services] are mixed, but...
whether their predominant factor, their thrust, their purpose, reasonably stated,
is the rendition of service, with goods incidentally involved . ..or is a

transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved. . ."'If the service is
only incidental to the sale, the seller/service provider may be strictly liable
because the sale was the predominant factor of the transaction.-"
In the 1967 case Magrine v. Krasnica,52 a New Jersey county court
declined to hold a dentist strictly liable for injuries caused by a defective
hypodermic needle that broke in the patient's jaw during treatment.53 The court
held that the situation's novelty did not "justify a headlong leap to impose strict
liability" on "a dentist, or any other 'user' of an article... for injuries caused
'
by a latent defect therein."54
The court distinguished the dentist from a
commercial salesman:
".

[T]he essence of the transaction between the retail seller and
the consumer relates to the article sold. The seller is in the
business of supplying the product to the consumer. It is that,
and that alone, for which he is paid. A dentist or a physician
offers, and is paid for, his professional services and skill. That
is the essence of the relationship between him and his
patient.55
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed this ruling in 1969.6 However, later
in 1969 the same court held that when a commercial service is involved in a
hybrid transaction, a court may hold the service provider strictly liable for a

48. The Essence Test was first applied in Clay v. Yates, 156 Eng. Rep. 1123 (1856).
This case involved the printing of a book, which included the service of printing as well as the
sale of paper and binding cloth. The court noted that "the true criterion is, whether work is the
essence of the contract, or whether it is the materials supplied." Id. at 1125. Other courts
applying the Essence Test include: Hoff v. Zimmer, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 872, 875 (W.D. Wis.
1990) (hip prosthesis);Hector v. Cedars-SinaiMedicalCenter,225 Cal. Rptr. 595,599 (Ct. App.
1986) (pacemaker); Silverhartv. Mount ZionHospital,98 Cal. Rptr. 187,190-91 (Ct. App. 1971)
(surgical needle); and Ayyash v. Henry FordHealth Systems, 533 N.W.2d 353, 355 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1995) (temporomandibular joint implants).
49. 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974).
50. Id. at 960.
51. Id.
52. 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct., N.J. 1967), aff'dsub nom. Magrine v. Spector,

241 A.2d 637 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968) (per curiam), aft'd,250 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1969) (per
curiam).
53. Id. at 547.
54. Id. at 540.
55. Id. at 543.
56. Magrine v. Spector, 250 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1969) (per curiam).
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defective product used in rendering the service. 7 In that case, the court held a
beauty parlor strictly liable for injuries to a patron caused by a defective
permanent wave solution.58 The court found that despite the hybrid nature of
the transaction, the sale was still a sale, and an implied warranty of fitness
existed.59
Careful to distinguish its earlier affirmation of Magrine v. Krasnica, the
New Jersey Supreme Court differentiated professional services-particularly
medical services-from commercial services such as those offered by a
beautician. The court noted the following: medical professionals cater to
medical needs, not aesthetic desires; medical professionals are unable to
advertise their services; medical professionals use their experiencedjudgment
to diagnose the patient and to decide what treatment is necessary; medicine is
not an exact science, so no implied warranty that treatment will be infallible
can exist; and the importance of medical services outweighs the need to impose
strict liability on health care providers.6"
C. Maintainingthe Seller/Service ProviderDistinctionfor Health Care
Providers
The Essence Test is an adequate tool for determining whether a medical
service provider is also a seller when the defective device is merely an
instrument used during medical treatment. Applying the Essence Test, one can
logically conclude that a health care provider is not a "seller" if the defective
product in question is a hypodermic needle or scalpel used during surgery. A
patient neither bargains for, nor obtains title to, such instruments. Therefore,
these instruments are only incidentally involved in the service provided.
However, the Essence Test is not as helpful when a medical device is surgically
implanted or otherwise transferred. Is the transfer of an artificial pacemaker
only incidentally involved in the surgical procedure by which it is implanted?
Or is the labor of surgery only incidental to transferring the pacemaker?
Despite the difficulty of resolving these questions, courts generally refuse to
hold hospitals or doctors strictly liable even when the sole purpose of surgery

57. See Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 258 A.2d 697, 702 (N.J. 1969) (stating that the
seller is liable if the product in a sales/service hybrid transaction is in "a dangerously defective
condition").
58. Id. at 705.
59. Id. at 702. For more discussion on the applicability of the Uniform Commercial
Code to commercial hybrid transactions, see United States v. Southern Contracting of
Charleston,Inc., 862 F. Supp. 107, 109-10 (D.S.C. 1994) (noting that courts typically use the
"predominant factor" test to determine the applicability of the U.C.C. to hybrid transactions, and
holding that a contract for provision and installation of an incinerator was predominantly a sale);
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 40, § 9-2, at 331-32 (explaining that most courts use the
predominant factor test in deciding whether the U.C.C. applies to a contract involving both a sale
and a service).
60. Neivmark, 258 A.2d at 702-03.
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is the transfer of a medical device. 6'
The California Court of Appeals applied the Essence Test in Hector v.
Cedars-SinaiMedical Center,62 where a former patient sued a hospital under
strict liability in tort and breach of warranty for supplying him with a defective
pacemaker. The court found that "[t]he essence of the relationship between
hospital and patient is the provision of professional medical services necessary
to effect the implantation of the pacemaker-the patient does not enter the
hospital merely to purchase a pacemaker but to obtain a course of treatment
which includes implantation of a pacemaker."63 The court posited that the
hospital was not "'engaged in the business of distributing [pacemakers],"' but
instead engaged in the business of providing health care services.64
Similarly, in Cafazzo v. Central Medical Health Services, Inc.,65 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court suggested that the application of strict liability to
a health care provider who implanted a mandibular prosthesis 66 would ignore
the "ancillary nature" of the device. 67 The court refused to view the skills
required to implant prosthetic devices as "adjunct to the sale of the implants. 68
The hospital's charging the patient for the medical device separately did not,
according to the court, support the contention that the health care provider was
involved primarily as the seller of the implant.69
The Florida District Court of Appeal applied the Essence Test to breast
implants in Porterv. Rosenberg.7" The court affirmed the trial court's order
dismissing the strict liability complaint against the plastic surgeon, finding
strict liability inapplicable to "a physician who supplies a product to a patient
where the medical services could not have been rendered without using the
product and where the predominant purpose of the transaction is the provision
of medical services.' 71
Though courts typically use the Essence Test to exempt hospitals from
strict liability for the defective products they supply, a Texas court in Thomas

61. See, e.g., Porter v. Rosenberg, 650 So. 2d 79, 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (noting
the distinction between defective instruments that are used and defective implants that are
transferred, but nevertheless finding medical services the essence of the transaction in breast
implant surgery); KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 104, at 720; Ryan & Lawn, supra note 42, at
831-32.
62. 225 Cal. Rptr. 595 (Ct. App. 1986).
63. Id. at 599.
64. Id. (quoting Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal. 1964)).
65. 668 A.2d 521 (Pa. 1995).
66. A mandibular (or temporomandibular) prosthesis is a jaw implant.
67. Cafazzo, 668 A.2d at 524.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 650 So. 2d 79, 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
71. Id. at 80.
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v. St. JosephHospital 2 reached the opposite result using the test.'3 However,
the dispositive fact in Thomas was that the defective product was provided not
during medical treatment but in the course of an administrative hospital
procedure. A defective hospital gown had ignited and fatally burned the patient
wearing it.74 The court stated: "Where... a hospital apparently supplies a
product unrelated to the essential professional relationship, we hold that it
cannot be said that as a matter of law the hospital did not introduce the harmful
product into the stream of commerce.""5
Thus, despite judicial reluctance to apply strict liability to hospitals and
doctors, some courts apply it when the services involved are not professional.
Why do courts refuse to extend the application to professional medical
services? The court in Thomas apparently was influenced by the plaintiffs
argument that "no public policy supports extension of immunity to a hospital
that supplies a defective product not integrally related to the professional
services it renders."76' The decision points to the main impetus behind judicial
reluctance to hold health care providers strictly liable for medically transferred
defective products-public policy.
1. Professionalvs. CommercialServices: Policy Justificationsfor
Strict LiabilityDo Not Apply to Health Care ProvidersBecause
They Are Professionals
Courts applying the Essence Test to defective medical devices almost
always buttress their somewhat illogical results with policy justifications,
perhaps realizing the arbitrary hairsplitting often involved in holding that one
aspect of a hybrid transaction predominates over another. Most of the policy
considerations, in turn, rest on the professional/commercial distinction
elucidated in Newmark77 and Thomas. These considerations consistently
presuppose the existence of a wide chasm between the transfer of articles
through skilled medical services and the sale of commercially marketed goods.
Many of these policy arguments are simply assertions that imposing strict
liability on health care providers would not coincide with the goals of and
justifications for strict liability in tort.7" For example, courts and commentators

72. 618 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
73. Id. at 796-97; see also Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065, 1067
(E.D. Wis. 1973) (holding that a hospital may be strictly liable for products supplied through
administrative, but not professional, services).
74. Thomas, 618 S.W.2d at 793.
75. Id. at 796-97.
76. Id. at 796.
77. Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 258 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1969).
78. See, e.g., Ayyash v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 533 N.W.2d 353, 355 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1995) ("[Tlhose economic theories that underlie the imposition of strict liability upon
makers and sellers ofproducts do notjustify the extension ofstrict liability to those who provide
medical services.").
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propose that applying the doctrine to health care providers, who have no
control over, or input in, the manufacture of medical instruments or devices,
would not serve the deterrence justification for strict liability.79 In addition,
majority rule proponents contend that health care providers, unlike
manufacturers, cannot effectively distribute the risk of loss caused by defective
products because of their relatively small client base."0 When making this
argument, courts and commentators frequently point to the individual2
1
practitioner or the small hospital." They also cite comment c to section 402A,
which discusses the risk-spreading justifications for imposing strict liability on
those who "market" products and can incorporate the "burden of accidental
injuries caused by products" into the cost of their production.8 3 Majority rule
proponents contend that health care providers cannot further the risk-spreading
purpose because they do not market or advertise medical devices and
instruments.84 Furthermore, any risk spreading they could accomplish would
be so limited as to be inefficient."5
Majority rule proponents argue that the cost of imposing strict liability on
health care providers would far outweigh the benefits. Medical treatment would
become prohibitively expensive, necessarily reflecting the cost of insurance
that strict liability would force health care providers to obtain for defective
products.8 6 Costs would further increase if health care providers had to hire
their own researchers to test products for defects. 7 Majority rule proponents
also assert that imposing strict liability would hinder medical advances because
doctors would refrain from using new devices, fearing liability for any defects

79. Id. at 356; David Crump &Larry A. Maxwell, Should Health Service Providers
Be StrictlyLiableforProduct-Relatedlnjuries?A LegalandEconomicAnalysis, 36 Sw.L.J. 831,

854-55 (1982).
80. Cf Magrine v. Krasnica, 227 A.2d 539,545-46 (Hudson County Ct., N.J. 1967)
(noting that although a medical professional could effectively spread the risk by impleading the
supplier or manufacturer, often the medical professional cannot do so because the supplier and
manufacturer are unknown), affd sub nom. Magrine v. Spector, 241 A.2d 637 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1968) (per curiam), affd, 250 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1969) (per curiam).
81. See, e.g., Crump & Maxwell, supra note 79, at 853 (small rural hospital).
82. See, e.g., Cafazzo v. Central Med. Health Servs., Inc., 635 A.2d 151, 153 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1993), affd, 668 A.2d 521 (Pa. 1995); Crump &Maxwell, supra note 79, at 851-52.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965).
84. See Crump &Maxwell, supra note 79, at 852 (discussing the "widely accepted"
interpretation that "medical professional[s] do[] not advertise, merchandise, or make medical
products available for discrete sales to the public").
85. See id. at 853-54 (explaining that increased legal and incidental costs of imposing
strict liability on health care providers would create net losses to the public). In other words, if
health care providers incorporated the cost of liability into the cost ofproviding the product, no
one could afford the product.
86. See Magrine v. Krasnica, 227 A.2d 539, 545 (Hudson County Ct., N.J. 1967)
(rhetorically questioning whether anyone could dispute that costs were already increasing in
1967, after explaining that dentists and patients would spread the cost of insurance for strict
liability by increasing fees paid by patients), aff'd sub nom. Magrine v. Spector, 241 A.2d 637
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968) (per curiam), affd, 250 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1969) (per curiam).
87. See Crump & Maxwell, supra note 79, at 855.
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they may contain.88 Finally, proponents of the majority rule point to the
alternative legal avenues through which patients can seek compensation,
including strict liability actions against manufacturers or distributors89 and
negligence claims against health care providers.9
2. A FinalPolicy Justificationfor Not Imposing Strict Liability on
Health CareProviders:PreservingtheAvailabilityof "Healing"
Services
A recurrent refrain in cases involving the imposition of strict liability on
health care providers is that public policy demands courts preserve the
availability of medical services.9 Courts often express fear that if they impose
strict liability on health care providers, health care providers will cease
providing services. 92 Courts likewise worry that health care providers' new
insurance costs will make treatment prohibitively expensive, as mentioned
above. 93 Concern over treatment availability lies at the root of concerns about
increased costs and the hindering of medical development. The concept of
"healing" is emotionally more powerful and seems more sociologically
significant than any economic analysis of risk spreading or abstract anxiety
about scientific advancement.
The "treatment availability" argument ultimately subsumes the others;
indeed, the other considerations all seem to flow from the desire to keep highquality medical services publicly accessible. Courts frequently note the "special
and essential role" that health care providers occupy in our society. This
sentiment echoes dicta in the Newmark opinion:
[T]he nature of the [medical] services, the utility of and the
need for them, involving as they do, the health and even
survival of many people, are so important to the general
welfare as to outweigh in the policy, scale any need for the

88. See Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379,391 (Wis. 1977) (stating that "imposition
ofstrict liability might hamper progress in developing new medicines and medical techniques");
see also Richard A. Epstein, LegalLiabilityforMedicalInnovation, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 1139,
1142 (1987) ("Where products are subject to more stringent standards than medical services,
there is a risk that treatment (services) will be substituted for products (goods), even when the
latter is more suited to the task.").
89. See Magrine, 227 A.2d at 546 (noting that health care providers can implead the
manufacturer and that patients can reach suppliers through discovery).
90. See id. at 546; Cafazzo v. Central Med. Health Servs., Inc., 668 A.2d 521, 525-26
(Pa. 1995) (noting that health care providers could presumably be held negligent in providing
services for errors in choosing medical products).
91. See Cupp, supra note 12, at 879-80, 890-91; Frank J. Vandall, Applying Strict
Liability to Professionals: Economic and Legal Analysis, 59 IND. L.J. 25, 27-28 (1983-1984).
92. Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 258 A.2d 697, 703 (N.J. 1969); Hoven, 256 N.W.2d
at 391.
93. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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imposition on 94dentists and doctors of the rules of strict
liability in tort.

Like the Essence Test itself, these frequently cited policy concerns make
sense when applied to certain products, procedures, and circumstances, but are
less persuasive when applied to others. Critics of the majority rule exempting
health care providers from strict liability ask the following questions: Does the
Essence Test adequately classify hybrid transactions in which a product is
transferred and not merely used? Do the economic policy concerns behind the
majority rule take into account the increasingly commercial nature of modem
health care? Is the interest in preserving health care availability relevant in the
context of cosmetic surgery?
IV. CRITICISM OF THE MAJORITY RULE

Few courts have imposed strict liability on health care providers for
defective medical devices.9" The most significant minority rule case is Bell v.
PoplarBluff Physicians Group, Inc.,96 which the South Carolina Supreme
Court has declined to follow.9 Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the Bell decision
is not even from its state's highest court. Further, its holding that health care
providers may be strictly liable in tort for defective temporomandibular
implants applies only to hospitals; the court expressly declined to extend it to
individual doctors. 9 Though plaintiffs lack a large amount of supportive case

94. Newmark, 258 A.2d at 703; see also Hoven, 256 N.W.2d at 391 ("Medical
services are an absolute necessity to society, and they must be readily available to the people.").
Even courts rejecting the majority rule have noted that strict liability should not be imposed
lightly or carelessly on those that are vital to the maintenance of public health and life. See Bell
v. Poplar Bluff Physicians Group, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) ("'[I]n cases
which deal with the conduct of individuals or institutions which themselves are pledged to
protect human life and health, precautions must be taken to avoid an ultimate diminution of
protection."') (quoting Greenberg v. Michael Reese Hosp., 415 N.E.2d 390, 394 (II. 1980)).
95. See, e.g., Bell, 879 S.W.2d 618; see also Skelton v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 459 So.
2d 818, 823-24 (Ala. 1984) (reversing summary judgment for the hospital on an implied
warranty claim involving a defective suturing needle because a hospital is a "merchant" under
the U.C.C.); Garcia v. Edgewater Hosp., 613 N.E.2d 1243,1249(111. App. Ct. 1993) (holding the
hospital liable for breach of implied warranty of a defective heart valve).
96. 879 S.W.2d at 621 (reversing summary judgment for the hospital on a strict
liability claim for injuries caused by a defective temporomandibular implant).
97. See In re Breast Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 331 S.C. 540, 550-51,503 S.E.2d 445,
450-51 (1998).
98. Bell, 879 S.W.2d at 619 ("We recognize that the Western District of this court in
Hershley v. Brown held that strict liability is not a basis for recovery against medical physicians.
Whether there is a distinction between physicians and hospitals in the present context we need
not decide.. . .") (citation omitted); see also James W. Poppell, Comment, When Is a Sale a
Sale, and a Product a Product?Missouri Health Care Providers and Strict ProductLiability
Claims, 63 UMKC L. Rav. 283, 283 (1994) ("Under Missouri law, physicians are not subject to
strict liability in tort .... ).
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law, they nonetheless have an abundance of critical commentary ontheirside.99
A. TransferrableMedicalDevices,HybridTransactions,andthe Essence
Test
Technological advancement has produced a new breed of medical
products-those intended for transfer and not mere use. Examples of such
products include pacemakers, artificial valves, mandibular implants, penile
prosthetics, and intrauterine devices. Unlike a grounding pad or hypodermic
needle, the patient actually leaves the hospital in physical possession of these
implanted devices. Unfortunately, some argue, the law is lagging behind these
scientific
advancements by refusing to recognize this sort of transfer as a
00
sale.
When presented with implant cases, many courts blindly follow the
majority rule exempting health care providers from strict liability for defective
products;' a rule initially formulated in the context of hybrid transactions
involving incidental use of medical instruments. 0 2 Many of these courts even
fail to note the distinction between the use of these instruments and the transfer
of implanted medical devices. 0 3 Others mention the distinction
but nevertheless
10 4
proceed to follow the majority rule as though none exists.
Why do courts ignore or dismiss the distinction between used instruments
and transferred devices? Perhaps they realize that truly conceding the
difference would render the Essence Test ineffective, so they refuse to
acknowledge the distinction in order to maintain the test's viability. These
courts may want to rely on more than policy in exempting health care providers
from strict liability, so they turn a blind eye to the instrument/implant
dichotomy in order to preserve the analytical tool with which they can conclude
that even implanted devices are not "sold."'0 5 These courts fail to realize that

99. See articles cited infra Part IV.
100. See Adler, supra note 12, at 96.
101. See, e.g., Hector v. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 225 Cal. Rptr. 595 (Ct, App. 1986);
Cafazzo v. Central Med. Health Servs., Inc., 668 A.2d 521 (Pa. 1995); In re BreastImplant, 331
S.C. 540, 503 S.E.2d 445 (1998).
102. Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 98 Cal. Rptr. 187, 191 (Ct. App. 1971) (holding
that the hospital is not strictly liable for the use of a defective needle); Magrine v. Krasnica, 227
A.2d 539, 547 (Hudson County Ct., N.J. 1967) (holding that a dentist who used a defective
needle was not strictly liable), aff'dsub nom. Magrine v. Spector, 241 A.2d 637 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1968) (per curiam), aff'd, 250 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1969) (per curiam); Podrat v.
Codman-Shurtleff, Inc., 558 A.2d 895, 898 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that a hospital is not
liable for defective forceps used in surgery).
103. See Adler, supra note 12, at 107-08 (implying that courts misapply "surgical
instrument analysis" to implant cases).
104. See, e.g., Porter v. Rosenberg, 650 So. 2d 79, 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
105. Poppell, supra note 98, at 300 ("In order to avoid arguing these conclusions
strictly on policy grounds, the courts often resort to deciding that there is no 'sale' involved
between patient and doctor because the essence of the transaction is services-oriented.").
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truly valid policy justifications can indeed stand alone and that the
inappropriate Essence Test is an unstable and unnecessary foundation which
actually weakens the claims it is meant to support.
Some majority rule critics do not question the viability of the Essence Test
despite the instrument/implant distinction. However, these critics argue that a
properapplication of the Essence Test does not justify exempting health care
providers from strict liability for defective medical implants. Implying that the
test can nevertheless yield valid results when correctly implemented, these
critics argue that the "essence of the transaction" in implant procedures is the
implant itself, not the medical service of implanting it.' The Bell court
achieved this result by applying the Essence Test in this manner.0 7
A more defensible contention is that courts should not apply the Essence
Test to implant procedures at all.0 8 One cannot logically assert that the service
by which a pacemaker is implanted, rather than the pacemaker itself,
predominates a pacemaker operation. In seeking the procedure, patients do not
desire the implantation services more than the implant, or vice versa; they
necessarily desire both equally because they simply cannot have one without
the other.
Despite the criticism directed atparticular applications of the Essence Test,
the South Carolina Supreme Court's In re BreastImplant decision illustrates
that courts continue to apply it, even in transferred medical device cases. Courts
cling to the legal fiction that the services predominate implant surgery out of
reluctance to base a decision solely on public policy. However, many critics
argue that even the traditional policy justifications for refusing to extend strict
liability to health care providers are not well founded, especially in the implant
context.
B. Blurringthe Professional/CommercialDistinction:HospitalsAs Big
Business
Many of the policy justifications that support the health care provider

106. See Adler, supra note 12, at 96 (arguing that the supply ofsurgical devices, not
the services, can represent the essence of the transaction in many instances); Cupp, supra note
12, at 895-96 (arguing that at least in cases of cosmetic surgery, the consumer's expectations
focus more on the product than the services, and thus the sale of the implant is the predominant
factor). However, Adler also points out that the Essence Test, as traditionally applied, "is no
longer a viable option" with regard to some hybrid transactions. Adler, supra note 12, at 103-05.
107. The court distinguished between use and transfer but applied the Essence Test
anyway, finding that the "sales aspect of the transaction may predominate over the service aspect
and the policy of strict liability in tort is served by allowing this action." Bell v. Poplar Bluff
Physicians Group, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
108. Adler, supra note 12, at 103-05. Adler asserts that "[t]he essence test seems to
fail in a health care arena so filled with transactions in essential goods." Id. at 105. She criticizes
the test and questions its viability but does not expressly argue that itshould be rejected. Instead,
she emphasizes that implanted or otherwise transferred goods often themselves "reflect the crux
of the transaction." Id.
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exemption from strict liability relate to the distinction between professional and
commercial services.'O' But the increasingly commercial nature of health care
weakens the arguments that health care providers do not market goods, cannot
spread the risk of loss, and cannot deter defects. To a lesser extent, the
arguments that strict liability would prohibitively increase health care costs and
hinder medical research also suffer in light of the health care industry's
transformation into a big-business enterprise. Finally, the justification that
patients already have enough avenues of recovery often fails, at least with
respect to breast implants, because of the manufacturer's bankruptcy.
1. MarketingMedicalDevices
Health care providers argue that because they do not market medical
devices and are not in "the business of selling" them, they are outside the scope
of section 402A."' They likewise contend that breach of warranty actions
should not apply to them because they are not merchants. Health care providers
resist acknowledging their commercial nature, perhaps hoping no one will
notice that "the hospital of just twenty years ago bears little resemblance to
today's complex corporate entity."' However, the court in Skelton v. Druid
City HospitalBoard"2 did note:
We cannot ignore the fact that hospitals, whether profitable
or not, are businesses.
...In the course of their competition, hospitals certainly

hold themselves out to the public as having special
knowledge regarding the provision of medical services to
patients. Inherent in this presentment is a warranty that the
hospital will sell, frnish, or supply patients with goods for
use in the provision ofmedical services which are fit for their
intended purpose. For that reason, Druid City is clearly a
"merchant,"
within the Commercial Code's definition of that
3
word." 1

109. See supra Part III.C. 1.

110. This argument is based on comments c and fofsection 402A. See RESTATEMENT
§ 402A cmt. c (1965) (emphasizing that strict liability should be imposed
on those who market products); id.cmt. f(defining the "business of selling" and noting that "[i]t
is not necessary that the seller be engaged solely in the business of selling such products").
11. Paul L. Scibetta, Note, RestructuringHospital-PhysicianRelations: Patient
Care QualityDepends on the Health of HospitalPeer Review, 51 U. PiTT.L. REV. 1025, 1025
(1990).
112. 459 So. 2d 818 (Ala. 1984).
113. Id. at 822-23. The court further noted that even if it had determined that Druid
City was not a merchant, the hospital "would still be liable under U.C.C. § 2-315 because of the
nature of the patient's reliance on the skill and judgment of the hospital in the selection of
medical supplies used for the care of the patient." Id. at 823.
(SECOND) OF TORTS
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As for section 402A, the court in Bell dismissed the defendant hospital's

assertions that it was not in "the business of selling," holding that even if this
contention was true, courts should allow plaintiffs to maintain strict liability
claims "against a seller whether or not such sales are a substantial part of its
operation or business.""' 4 The Bell court believed that the incidental nature of
such a sale "should not relieve [a hospital] of liability any more than if a
hospital sells a defective toy at its gift shop or a hairdresser sells defective hair
spray which may be incidental to her other services.""'
These examples resemble the facts of Thomas,"6 the case involving the
defective hospital gown, and Newmark,"7 the case involving the defective perm
solution. The courts in both of those cases carefully distinguished between the
commercial or administrative services of furnishing these items and the
professional services involved in medical treatment. The Bell court refused to
draw such a distinction. The Bell court also noted that the defendant hospital
charged a $129 mark-up for the temporomandibular implant."' Although the
court did not consider the mark-up greatly significant," 9 such actions by health

114. Bell v. Poplar BluffPhysicians Group, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 618,619 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994).
115. Id. The court went on to note that "a sale of a product is not required to bring an
action for strict liability. Liability is imposed on those placing a product in the stream of
commerce." Id.; see also Henderson v. Gould, Inc., 288 S.C. 261,268, 341 S.E.2d 806, 810 (Ct.
App. 1986) (holding that though a sale is required for a breach of warranty action, the use of the
terms "sells" and "sellers" in section 402A and section 15-73-10 of the South Carolina Code is
"merely descriptive and the doctrine of strict liability may be applied if the requirements for its
application are otherwise met, even though no sale has occurred in the literal sense"). The
Henderson court further noted that the South Carolina Supreme Court "has implicitly recognized
that a sale is not required for the doctrine to be applied." Id. (citing Schall v. Sturm, Ruger Co.,
278 S.C. 646, 648, 300 S.E.2d 735,736 (1983) ("Recovery under Section 15-73-10, Code, does
not rest upon any rights or duties framed by some transaction,as in the case in a suit for breach
of warranty, even where privity has been abolished.")).
116. Thomas v. St. Joseph Hosp., 618 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
117. Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 258 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1969).
118. See Bell, 879 S.W.2d at 619 n.l.
119. See id.Other majority rule decisions have dismissed such charges as irrelevant
See, e.g., In re Breast Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 331 S.C. 540,548, 503 S.E.2d 445,449 (1998)
("[T]he thrust of the inquiry is not whether a separate consideration is charged for the products
used in the exercise of medical skill, but what service is performed to restore or maintain the
patient's health.").
Section 20 of the proposed final draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability, entitled "Definition of'One Who Sells or Otherwise Distributes,"' includes acomment
that contrasts the statements ofthese courts by emphasizing the significance of separately billing
a consumer for a product. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 20 cmt. d
(Proposed Final Draft 1997). Comment d, which discusses "sales-service combinations," states:
When the same person provides both products and
services in a commercial transaction, whether a
product has been sold may be difficult to determine.
When the product and service components are kept
separate by the parties to the transaction, as when a
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care defendants nevertheless illustrate their commercial nature. One would
think that if providers of pure professional services desired higher
compensation, they would simply increase the cost of their services rather than
marking up the product; that is, if they really believe their services
overwhelmingly predominate over the product's sale.
Scholars maintain that because advertising may inspire consumers to
exercise less caution in planning their purchases, the imposition of strict
liability on those who advertise defective products is all the more justified. 2 '
Consumers rely on the representations made in advertisements. To support the
argument that health care providers do not market their medical devices and are
not in the business of selling, the Newmark and Hoven courts mentioned that
health care providers do not advertise."' This argument is simply no longer
valid. Modem health care providers do in fact promote both their services and
their medical devices through advertisements. Magazines and newspapers often
contain ads for cosmetic surgery; in particular, ads that induce the consumer to
rely on both the skill and expertise of a particular doctor and on the safety of
the medical device involved.'2 Emily Aschinger has researched the incredible
lengths to which plastic surgeons have gone to promote their products:
In order to help create the demand for breast implants and
get implants into the stream of commerce, the American
Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons (ASPRS)
created a new disease. This medical problem is called
micromastia, small breasts, and it can be cured with breast
implants. The ASPRS told the FDA that "[t]here is a
substantial and enlarging body of medical information and
opinion that these deformities (small breasts) are really a
disease." "In a petition to the FDA, ASPRS said that small
breasts were 'deformities'-'really a disease'-causing 'a
total lack of well-being ... in most patients."' Now that small
breasts are a bona fide problem confirmed by the medical

lawn-care firm bills separately for fertilizer applied to
a customer's lawn or when a machinery repairer
replaces a component part and bills separately for it,
the firm will be held to be the seller of the product.
Id. Despite this assertion, the comment later warns of the double standard applied to hospitals:
"It should be noted that, in a strong majority ofjurisdictions, hospitals are held not to be sellers
of products they supply in connection with the provision of medical care, regardless of the
circumstances." Id.
120. See, e.g., Cupp, supra note 12, at 898-99.
121. Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 258 A.2d 697,702 (N.J. 1969); Hoven v. Kelble, 256
N.W.2d 379, 391 n.15 (Wis. 1977) ("Although physicians do hold themselves out as experts
deserving of reliance, they do not advertise, and it has been suggested that this factor is
significant.").
122. See Cupp, supra note 12, at 899 (stating that many magazines and newspapers
contain ads for cosmetic surgery).
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community, there are more than a few willing cosmetic
surgeons to help the diseased find the way to a cure."2
While Aschinger establishes the pattern and volume of advertisements for
cosmetic breast implants, she also points out that "[t]he American Medical
Association finds advertising to be an unprofessional practice."" Although
other types of medical devices are rarely promoted in this fashion, the
categorical argument that doctors do not advertise can no longer be used to
support the claim that health care providers, unlike sellers, do not market their
products and should thus be exempt from strict liability.
2. Spreadingthe Risk
"A general purpose for imposing strict liability on businesses is that they
are profiting from the sale of the product and thus, are in the best position to
redistribute the cost of compensating the injured."' Proponents of the majority
rule argue that because health care providers consist of relatively small,
charitable organizations and individual physicians, they cannot serve the riskspreading function of strict liability. This argument ignores the fact that the
typical modem hospital is not only a business driven by profits, but often a
huge corporate enterprise. 6 More and more business-like, hospitals, if not
individual doctors, are capable of compensating patients injured by defective
medical devices. The Utah Supreme Court's assertionthat "hospitals are bourns
of mercy and most physicians are unselfish disciples of relief and the cure of

123. Aschingersupra note 12, at 407 (footnotes omitted) (quoting, respectively, Kate
Dunn, Why Do Women Remake TheirBodies to Fit the Fashion?,THEGAZETrE (Montreal), Feb.
25, 1992, at A2, and Jan Gehorsam, Women Feeling Pressured to Sculpt a Perfect Body,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 29, 1992, at Al). After describing several specific ads for breast
implants, Aschinger asserts that "[t]he most graphic depiction of promoting the sale of breast
implants was in Tennessee in 1987. A radio station, in conjunction with a local plastic surgeon,
offered a free breast enlargement surgery as a radio giveaway." Id. at 409 (footnote omitted).
124. Aschinger, supra note 12, at 407; but see DAvE LINDORFF, MARKETPLACE
MEDICINE: THE RISE OF THE FOR-PROFIT HOsPITAL CHAINs 27 (1992) (noting that, in 1989,
hospitals spent $687 million on advertising and $853 million on other marketing).
125. Kristin B. Meyer, Comment, Silicone BreastImplants and HospitalLiability:
A New Forumfor Hybrid Transactions,99 DICK. L. REV. 439, 464 (1995).
126. See LINDORFF, supra note 124, at 12 ("It's hard to accept the idea that today
hospitals are becoming just another business. But they are."); see also Skelton v. Druid City
Hosp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818,822 (Ala. 1984) (noting that even ifa hospital does not make a profit,
it is nevertheless abusiness); Meyer, supra note 125, at 465 ("Of course, itis recognized that all
hospitals may notbe as profitable as others, but the same inequity exists in the business world.").
In fact, as a result of studies showing that hospitals do not provide free medical treatment in
proportion to the extent of their exemption, several states have challenged the tax-exempt status
of their non-profit hospitals. See Alice A. Noble et al., CharitableHospitalAccountability: A
Review andAnalysis ofLegal andPolicylnitiatives,26 J.L. MED. &ETHICs 116, 116-17 (1998).
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human ills[, not] profit-seeking vendors in the market place" '27 seems clearly
misplaced today, particularly with regard to plastic surgeons.
Comment c to section 402A states that "the consumer of such products is
entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper
persons to afford it are those who market the products."'2 8 Further, "public
policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products
intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be
treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be
obtained."' 29 Given the manner in which many hospitals and doctors market
their services and the medical devices they provide, and given the fact that
health care providers could obtain strict liability insurance, the rationale for
risk-spreading stated in comment c applies to these health care providers just
as it applies to commercial retailers and distributors. The court in Hoven v.
Kelble30 conceded that "[t]he hospital and doctor are in a better position than
the patient to bear and distribute the risk of loss.'' However, the court
ultimately refused to impose strict liability on health care providers out of
concern for the costs and availability of health care. Courts that have adopted
the majority rule, like the Hoven court, argue that insurance costs would not be
absorbed seamlessly into the production
cost of medical devices, but would
32
radically increase health care costs.
3. Increasingthe Costs ofHealth Care
Minority rule proponents maintain that the concern over increasing health
care costs is unwarranted. ' Commentators have found the argument that costs
would skyrocket unpersuasive because imposing strict liability on other
products, including essential items such as food and drugs, has clearly not
inspired prohibitive price increases. 34
' As businesspeople, health care providers
perhaps realize that if they raise prices too much, they will lose patients to the
competition.
In sum, minority rule proponents claim no reason exists to suspect that the
risk-spreading rationale would fail with respect to health care providers because

127. Dibblee v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 364 P.2d 1085, 1087
(Utah 1961).
128. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965).
129. Id.
130. 256 N.W.2d 379 (Wis. 1977).
131. Id. at 391.
132. Id.
133. See Adler, supra note 12, at 108-09.
134.
See Michael M. Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service
Transactions-ImpliedWarranties and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L.REv. 661, 687
(1974), quotedin Hoven, 256 N.W.2d at 391 n. 17; see also Cupp, supranote 12, at 891 (noting
that if courts applied strict liability to health care providers for cosmetic devices, any resulting
cost increase might even benefit society by discouraging consumers from purchasing them and,
therefore, from being injured by them).
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their purchase of insurance would lead to prohibitively expensive health care.
Though David Crump and Larry Maxwell have argued that insurance of this
sort would be more expensive than other kinds because of the range of products
involved and the lack of claims history and precedent,'35 such initial insurance
costs are not unusual when the insured subject matter is novel. If strict liability
was applied only to those devices that are transferred during medical treatment,
the amount of products would be manageable.
4. Deterrence
In response to the Cafazzo court's argument that "a hospital not involved
in the development or manufacture of the product" is not best positioned to
prevent a defective product's circulation,'36 the Bell court pointed out the ironic
truth of this statement with regard "to most products sold by retailers."' 37 The
traditional justification for extending strict liability to retailers despite this
argument is that a retailer's place in the distribution chain allows it to influence
the manufacturer to produce safer products.'38 A retailer can simply refuse to
buy a product that has not been thoroughly tested or that poses a known risk.
In that sense, the retailer does have control over a product, even though it may
not participate directly in its manufacture.
Health care providers enjoy even more control than most retailers because
they provide the only avenue through which a patient can obtain a medical
device; purchasing implants directly from manufacturers would do patients
little good. 3 9 Also, because of the essential role health care providers play in
the implantation and distribution of medical devices, patients rely completely
on providers' judgment in selecting the devices, typically having no input in
brand selection."4 Manufacturers are surely aware of this reliance and of health
care providers' resulting control over what they produce.

135. Crump & Maxwell, supra note 79, at 854.
136. Cafazzo v. Central Med. Health Servs. Inc., 635 A.2d 151, 154 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1993), aff'd, 668 A.2d 521 (Pa. 1995).
137. Bell v. Poplar Bluff Physicians Group, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 618,620 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994). The arguments of Crump and Maxwell, like the Cafazzo court's argument, are applicable
to all retailers. Therefore, such arguments do not credibly distinguish health care providers as
a special class that should be immune from strict liability.
138. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal. 1964); Meyer,
supra note 125, at 461.
139. See Adler, supra note 12, at 109 ("[T]here may be more cause to apply strict
liability to the hospital, as the hospital and the health care profession in general have a unique
relationship with their consumers."); Meyer, supranote 125, at 462 ("[A]n individual's purchase
of breast implants directly from the manufacturer would be utterly useless.").
140. See Meyer, supra note 125, at 463.
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5. HinderingMedicalAdvancements
In Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.'4' the court maintained that holding
medical professionals strictly liable might discourage them from performing
treatment that "involves a developing area of medicine," remarking that this
practice "would work a serious social disservice."' 4 2 However, "the charge that
the tort system undermines innovation, keeps valuable products out of the
market, and halts research investmenthas neverbeen documented.' ' 43 Research
and development of prescription drugs, for example, have significantly44
increased since products liability suits have become common in that area.
Though the Hoven court declined to extend strict liability to a hospital, it did
not find the argument that the "imposition of strict liability might hamper
progress in developing new medicines and medical techniques" completely
persuasive.

45

6. Adequate Compensationfrom Manufacturer
The contention that patients can recover adequate compensation from
sources other than health care providers runs somewhat thin when the
manufacturer has declared bankruptcy.' 46Manufacturer bankruptcy is often the
sole reason plaintiffs sue health care providers under strict liability, a theory
widely held inapplicable to doctors and hospitals. 47 When defects are
discovered in popular devices like breast implants, which have been supplied
to over two million women, the probability that the manufacturer will become
bankrupt is very high. 48 Because plaintiffs cannot recover from health care
providers for negligence when the defective nature of the product was the sole
cause of the injury, they are left with no source of compensation when courts
deny their strict liability claims. In these situations, if health care providers are
not strictly liable, the risk-spreading function of strict liability is confounded;
the party least able to bear the loss-the consumer-is forced to do so.
However, majority rule proponents would likely counter this contention by

141. 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
142. Id. at 1067.
143. Adler, supra note 12, at 110; see also id. ("[R]esearch and development
expenditures have more than doubled.").
144. Id.

145. Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379, 391 (Wis. 1977); see id. at 391 n.17.
146. See generally Cupp, supra note 12, at 903-06 (discussing how "Medical
Professionals May Become the Only Parties Against Whom Recovery Is Available"). Dow
Coming, the leading manufacturer of breast implants, declared bankruptcy in 1995. See Michael
Higgins, Mass Tort Makeover?, 84 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1998, at 53, 54.
147. InAyyash v. HenryFordHealth Systems, 533 N.W.2d 353 (Mich. App. 1995),
the court recognized that imposing strict liability on the medical profession would only benefit
the few who, for reasons such as bankruptcy, cannot obtain recovery from manufacturers. Id. at
355.
148. See Cupp, supranote 12, at 905 (discussing Dow Corning's economic liability).
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asking whether holding health care providers liable merely because the
manufacturer's pockets are empty is really justifiable.
C. Cosmetic Procedures: A "Healing"Service?
Concern that the availability of medical treatment will suffer if courts
impose strict liability on health care providers, because of either prohibitive
cost or reluctance of doctors and hospitals to provide certain services, underlies
all other policy considerations. But if courts imposed strict liability only when
a health care provider implants or otherwise transfers a medical device to a
patient, only these procedures would be affected. While anxiety over the
accessibility of such procedures is perhaps warranted with regard to medically
necessary devices, cosmetic devices such as breast implants hardly fall under
the category of "healing" services in need of special protection. Even those
implants provided to women who have had mastectomies are arguably not
"medically necessary."' 49

But should a court distinguish between cosmetic and medically necessary
devices with regard to holding health care providers strictly liable for device
defects? The court in Weissman v. Dow Corning Corp.' found the cosmetic,
rather than the "healing," nature of the plaintiff's surgery legally insignificant,
stating "[w]e are not even sure that the distinction between a cosmetic
procedure and 'an act of healing' is susceptible to objective, legal articulation"
because "[m]any legitimate medical procedures undoubtedly serve both
purposes.'' Indeed, though policy considerations do not justify immunity
from strict liability for health care providers supplying purely cosmetic devices,
a court or legislature would not likely open that can of worms for practical
reasons.
Without distinguishing between cosmetic and medically necessary surgery,
concem over maintaining the availability of medical services is valid. However,
if courts applied strict liability to health care providers, the nation's doctors
would not likely give up medicine and begin selling used cars. Likewise,
hospitals across the country would not suddenly shut their doors to the sick and
infirm. Because of their commercial nature, and because they supply something
that will always be in demand, hospitals would find a way to recover.
Moreover, they would be forced to recover without increasing costs to a

149. See id. at 907 (explaining that the definition of "cosmetic" covers all breast
implants, "regardless of whether they were purchased in response to a mastectomy or merely to
make breasts larger"); but see id.at 906 ("Given the physical deformity caused by a mastectomy
and the widely recognized psychological impact of such an operation, one might certainly
question whether implanting a silicone breast following a mastectomy should be considered
cosmetic as opposed to therapeutic.")
150. 892 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
151. Id. at 517 n.8; see also Hufft v. Horowitz, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 383 (Ct. App.
1992) (involving penile implant designed to improve aesthetic appearance as well as to alleviate
impotency).
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prohibitive level in order to maintain their broad client base.
V. THE SOUTH CAROLINA DECISION

A. ProceduralBackground
The South Carolina Supreme Court heard oral arguments on matters
relating to health care provider liability for defective breast implants in
February of 1998 and issued its decision in June of that year. In re Breast
ImplantProductLiabilityLitigation' 2 reached the court in an unconventional
fashion." 3 For expediency, manufacturers were set apart as one group of
152. 331 S.C. 540, 503 S.E.2d 445 (1998).
153. In its opinion, the court explained:
In August 1993, Chief Justice David W.
Harwell assigned Judge Henry F. Floyd to dispose of
all pre-trial motions and other matters arising out of
the breast implant litigation then pending, and to be
subsequently filed, in this state's court system. In
April 1995, Chief Justice Ernest A. Finney, Jr. issued
an order granting permission to Judge Floyd to
promulgate a Case Management Order regulating pretrial proceedings in the breast implant cases.
In November 1996, Judge Floyd issued an
order addressing the defendants' motion to dismiss
the master complaint. The circuit court dismissed
certain of the causes of action in the master
complaint. Among the causes of action not dismissed
were those for strict liability, breach of implied
warranties, and breach of express warranty. After
Plaintiffs proposed an amended master complaint,
adding a cause of action for the common law
warranty of soundness and quality, the defendants
again moved to dismiss the complaint. Judge Floyd
denied the motion. The circuit court then, sua sponte,
moved to certify to this Court two questions related to
the applicability of S.C. Code Ann. § 15-73-10 (1976)
and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A to
Healthcare Defendants.
In addition, Healthcare Defendants
petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review
Judge Floyd's orders regarding the applicability of
strict liability and warranty causes of action to
Healthcare Defendants. In March 1997, we issued an
order granting Healthcare Defendants' petition. We
found that there is no provision, under Rule 228(a),
SCACR, for this Court to answer questions certified
by a state circuit judge; however, we agreed with
Judge Floyd that very important questions of law
need to be answered at this time. Accordingly, the
request for certification was denied, but the petition
for a writ of certiorari was granted.
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defendants, and hospitals and doctors together formed another defendant
category (despite their differing roles in breast implant provision).
The court mentioned the unusual nature of this procedural background in
a footnote, pointing out that the court generally will not grant certiorari for
matters "that can be entertained in the trial court or on appeal."' 4 The court
defined the breast implant litigation as presenting "exceptional circumstances,"
explaining that the issuance of a writ of certiorari is in order when such
circumstances are present.' 55 Because the matter involved "[n]ovel questions
of law concerning issues of significant public interest that are contained in
numerous state and federal actions," the court agreed to review the case to best
"serve the interests ofjudicial economy."' 56
Perhaps the problems imposed by breast implant litigation in other
jurisdictions influenced the court. Federal breast implant litigation in the
Northern District of Alabama, for example, has dominated U.S. District Judge
Sam Pointer Jr.'s docket for the past six years. 7 In 1992 Judge Pointer was
chosen "to manage discovery in federal implant cases," which so far have
totaled about 27,000 cases.' Judge Pointer had to relinquish his criminal
docket and establish an office to handle the administration of settlement
claims.'59 By resolving some of the important issues involved in breast implant
litigation, such as whether strict products liability applies to health care
providers, the South Carolina Supreme Court has served judicial economy.
B. The Court'sAnalysis
The court considered whether a health care provider who uses or provides
a medical instrument or device is liable under the following: (1) South
Carolina's strict tort liability statute, 60 (2) South Carolina's statutory versions
of the Uniform Commercial Code's express16 ' and implied warranties, 62 and
(3) a common-law warranty of soundness and quality.'63 The court noted that
"[t]he determinative issue in this case is whether a health care provider... is
a 'seller' within the meaning of section 15-73-10."'" Thus, most of the opinion

Id. at 542-43, 503 S.E.2d at 446-47 (footnote omitted).
154. Id. at 543 n.2, 503 S.E.2d at 447 n.2.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 54344 n.2, 503 S.E.2d at 447 n.2.
157. See Higgins,supra note 146, at 54 (quoting Judge Pointer assaying that breast
implant litigation "has probably, professionally, taken 80 percent of my time").
158. Id.
159. Id. at 55.
160. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
161. Id. § 36-2-313.
162. Id. §§ 36-2-314 to -315.
163. The In reBreastImplant court indicated that South Carolina does not recognize
a common-law warranty of soundness and quality in the medical context. See In re Breast
Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 331 S.C. 540, 553, 503 S.E.2d 445, 452 (1998).
164. Id. at 545, 503 S.E.2d at 448.
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is devoted to strict liability in tort.
Reversing Judge Floyd's November 1996 ruling that South Carolina's
Defective Products Act 16S applies to health care providers, rendering them
strictly liable in tort for defective instruments or devices used in surgery, the
court adopted the majority rule that health care providers are not "sellers" for
strict liability purposes. 66 Perhaps in the interest of brevity, the court provided
little original analysis, instead listing majority-rule cases and summarizing their
holdings.'67 The court's failure to justify its decision with lengthy policy
arguments ironically makes its ruling seem more justified, as if the court was
so confident in the majority rule that it found policy-related rationalization
simply unnecessary. By omitting reference to the policy arguments that so
many commentators have criticized as weak and inapplicable to health care
providers, the court effectively shielded its ruling from attack on these grounds.
1. Blood Shield Statutes
The court dismissed the plaintiffs' argument that implant providers are
subject to strict tort liability under section 15-73-10 because they are not
specifically exempted in the statute. The plaintiffs noted that section 44-43-10
exempts the providers of blood products from implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness; 68 therefore, if the legislature had intended to
exempt implant providers from liability under section 15-73-10, it would have
done so in the same fashion-by expressly exempting them. 69 The court found
the argument reasonable from the standpoint of statutory construction but held
that the argument ignored relevant case law specifically addressing health care
providers' immunity from strict liability for defective devices and
170
instruments.

Section 44-43-10 is what is commonly known as a "blood shield statute."
It states that blood and human tissues are not to be thought of as products or
"commodities subject to sale or barter."' 7' The section further specifies that the
transfer of these substances "shall be considered a medical service," not a
sale.'72 Forty-seven other states have enacted similar statutes.73
"[B]lood shield statutes indicate a clear legislative intent to treat blood
differently than other goods intended forhuman consumption.' ' 7 Most of these
statutes were enacted in the 1970s and 1980s in response to legislative fears of

165. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-73-10 to -30 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
166. In re Breast Implant, 331 S.C. at 553, 503 S.E.2d at 452.
167. Id.
168. S.C. CODEANN. § 44-43-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
169. In re Breast Implant, 331 S.C. at 545, 503 S.E.2d at 448.
170. Id.
171. S.C. CODEANN. § 44-43-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
172. Id.
173. See Adler, supranote 12, at 124.
174. Id.
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disease proliferation through infected blood. 7 ' The fundamental role blood
transfusions play in countless medical procedures, in addition to anxiety over
the spread of AIDS and hepatitis, led legislatures to separate blood from other
products used or transferred during medical treatment. 76 The obvious fact that,
unlike medical devices, blood and human tissue are not manufactured further
sets these medically transferred articles apart from breast implants.
Because courts typically "resolve tainted blood claims simply by
reviewing the applicable statute,"'177blood cases decided after ajurisdiction has

enacted a blood shield statute bear little relevance to medical device cases.
However, a court could find cases decided before a blood shield statute's
enactment are still good law with respect to other products and that these cases
remain valid precedent for medical device cases. In Garcia v. Edgewater
Hospital78 the Illinois Appellate Court recognized that Illinois's enactment of
a blood shield statute effectively overruled its decision in Cunningham v.
MacNealMemorialHospital,179in which it held a hospital strictly liable for the
transfer of defective blood. Nevertheless, the court found Cunningham "still
controlling with respect to other sales," relying on it to hold the defendant
hospital liable under an implied warranty of merchantability for supplying the
plaintiff with a defective heart valve. 8 °
Despite Garcia,the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the idea that
Cunningham could apply to medical device cases.'' The court repudiated
Cunningham as a decision that had been "superseded by statute,"'8 2 citing the
Illinois post-blood-shield-statute case Advincula v. United Blood Services.8
Perhaps because the plaintiffs failed to cite Garcia in their briefs,' the
supreme court failed to acknowledge it. At any rate, Garciais a minority rule
decision based on another minority rule decision that has arguably become bad
law. Therefore, even if the South Carolina Supreme Court had considered the

175. See id.
176. See id.
177. Ryan & Lawn, supra note 42, at 821.
178. 613 N.E.2d 1243, 1248 (Il. App. Ct. 1993).
179. 266 N.E.2d 897 (Ill. 1970).
180. Garcia,613 N.E.2d at 1248. Because the Cunningham decision followed the
minority rule, most courts relying on pre-blood-shield-statute cases would arrive at the opposite
conclusion. The leading pre-blood-shield-statute case is Perlmutterv. Beth David Hospital,123
N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1954), in which the New York Court of Appeals opined that services were the
essence of the transaction in a blood transfusion. Id. at 794.
181. In re Breast Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 331 S.C. 540, 551, 503 S.E.2d 445, 451
(1998).
182. Id.
App. Ct. 1995), rev'don othergrounds, 678 N.E.2d 1009
183. 654 N.E.2d 644 (111.
(Ill. 1996). InAdvincula, the court stated: "By enacting [the blood shield statute], the legislature
was responding to [Cunningham,] which held a hospital strictly liable for the sale of tainted
blood to a patient." Id. at 650. Interestingly, Advincula also failed to mention Garcia,which has
no negative history.
184. See Brief of Respondents at ii-iv; see also Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted on
Behalf of the South Carolina Trial Lawyers Association at ii.
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Garcia holding regarding Cunningham, the court would likely still have
rejected Cunningham as flatly as it rejected Bell.
2. The Defective ProductsAct Does Not Apply to Services
In In re Breast Implant the South Carolina Supreme Court explained that
section 15-73-10, which codifies section 402A nearly verbatim, does not apply
to services.' DeLoach v. Whitney 16 provided the court's "analytic starting
point."'81 7 In DeLoach, the defendant, after installing new tires, left a
deteriorated valve stem on the wheel of the plaintiffs car. The valve stem,
which was not a part of any tire, later ruptured while the plaintiff was driving,
injuring him.' 8 "The sole issue submitted to the jury was whether the appellant
was liable under strict liability for failing to install a new valve stem or not
warning respondent of the deteriorated condition of the one on the wheel."' 89
The court declined to extend
strict tort liability to the "negligent installation of
90
a non-defective product."'
The In reBreastImplantcourt explained that althoughDeLoach is unclear
as to whether services generally are outside the scope of section 15-73-10, its
holding in Samson v. Greenville HospitalSystem' 9' clarifies DeLoach.92
' The
Samson court held that section 15-73-10 "imposes strict liability in tort upon
the suppliers of defective products. This section applies only to products and
not to services."' 93 ThoughSamsonis a post-blood-shield-statute case involving
blood, it shows that pure services generally are not subject to strict liability in
South Carolina. The court properly declined to equate blood with implants or
other medical products, referring to Samson only for its interpretation of
DeLoach and
94 for its broad holding regarding the service exemption of section

15-73-1 0.

Importantly, Samson construes DeLoach as holding only that service
providers are not strictly liablefor their services. The cases focus on whether
services qualify as products under section 15-73-10, not on whether service
providers are sellers under section 15-73-10. Thus, the cases do not directly
address the issue at hand, namely, whether a service provider that transfers a
defective product while providing services is liable as a seller of that product.
Rather, Samson and DeLoach merely establish that the term "products" in the
statute does not encompass services. Neither case addresses the scope of the

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

In re Breast Implant, 331 S.C. at 545-46, 503 S.E.2d at 448.
275 S.C. 543, 273 S.E.2d 768 (1981).
See In re Breast Implant, 331 S.C. at 546, 503 S.E.2d at 448.
DeLoach, 275 S.C. at 543-44, 273 S.E.2d at 768-69.
Id. at 544, 273 S.E.2d at 769.
Id. at 545, 273 S.E.2d at 769.
297 S.C. 409, 377 S.E.2d 311 (1989) (per curiam).
See In re Breast Implant, 331 S.C. at 546, 503 S.E.2d at 448.
Samson, 297 S.C. at 410, 377 S.E.2d at 311.
In re Breast Implant, 331 S.C. at 546, 503 S.E.2d at 448.
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term "seller." As noted earlier,' breast implants are products; this fact has long
been established and is not the dispositive issue.
Despite accurately portraying the holdings of Samson and DeLoach, the
court concluded: "[W]hen analyzed together, DeLoach and Samson teach that
providers of services may not be held liable under section 15-73-10."196 Though
this overly broad statement stretches the combined effect of the two holdings,
the court apparently wished to convey that it was merely restating an
established rule that service providers are not liable under section 15-73-10for
their services. However, by going on to apply the Essence Test, the court
implicitly acknowledged South Carolina's remaining need to settle the question
of service-provider liability under section 15-73-10for selling.197
3. Services Are the Essence ofthe Transaction
Having established that section 15-73-10 does not apply to services, the
court turned to the "pivotal" question of "whether health care providers,
including those who perform breast implant procedures, offer services or
products."' 98 The court declared: "In analyzing this question, we must consider
whether the essence of the transaction is the provision of a service or a
product."'9 9 Though the court cited no authority to support its application,
South Carolina courts have used the predominant factor test for many years. 200
The court determined that health care providers who perform breast
augmentation procedures are "fundamentally and predominantly offering a
service" because of the medical expertise required. 20 ' The court noted that an
implant "may not be purchased independently of the service ' 20 2 but failed to
acknowledge that the converse is also true-one may not obtain the service
without the implant. The interdependence of the implant and the procedure
contradicts the court's holding that the service predominates; rather, both the
195. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
196. In re BreastImplant, 331 S.C. at 547, 503 S.E.2d at 448.
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., United States v. Southern Contracting of Charleston, Inc., 862 F. Supp.
107, 109 (D.S.C. 1994) (applying the predominant factor test to a contract for the provision and
installation of an incinerator); Kline Iron & Steel Co. v. Gray Communications Consultants, Inc.,
715 F. Supp. 135, 139 (D.S.C. 1989) (applying the predominant factor test to a contract for the
construction of a television tower); Ranger Constr. Co. v. Dixie Floor Co., 433 F. Supp. 442,445
(D.S.C. 1977) (applying the predomiriant factor test to a flooring installation contract); Plantation
Shutter Co. v. Ezell, 328 S.C. 475, 478-79,492 S.E.2d 404, 406 (Ct. App. 1997) (applying the
predominant factor test to a contract for the special manufacture and installation of shutters).
Though the author found no South Carolina cases applying the essence or predominant factor
test to a strict tort liability claim, the similarities between implied warranty actions and strict tort
liability actions and the equivalent nature of the predominant factor test and the Essence Test
render the court's ready adoption of the two tests for section 15-73-10 a logical step.
201. In re Breast Implant, 331 S.C. at 547, 503 S.E.2d at 448.
202. Id. at 547, 503 S.E.2d at 449.
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service and the implant are equally necessary for breast augmentation surgery.
After finding the procedure to be primarily a service, the court explained
that strict liability in tort is generally inapplicable to service providers, not only
for a defective service as indicated by Samson and DeLoach, but also for a
defective product "'used"' while rendering the service. 2 3 Unlike the courts in
20
Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc.2" and Magrine v. Krasnia,
' the court failed to
justify its decision by expressly distinguishing professional and nonprofessional
services.21 Even though DeLoach is irrelevant to the scope of the term "seller"
in section 15-73-10, the court's reliance on this commercial service-provider
case emphasizes its failure to assert explicitly that a different standard applies
to health care providers and other professionals than to commercial service
providers.
By failing to draw a distinction between commercial and professional
services, the court obviated the need to discuss extensive public policy
justifications for its decision based on the noncommercial nature of hospitals.
Implying that service-provider immunity to strict liability in tort applies equally
to commercial and professional service providers, the court escaped having to
explain why doctors and hospitals receive a special exemption despite their
growing client bases, huge profits, and increased marketing. The court avoided
this explanation by refusing to acknowledge that a special "professional"
exemption exists.
Importantly, however, the professional/commercial distinction controls the
results of the Essence Test, and, therefore, the distinction need not be made
after a court applies the test. The determination of whether the sale or the
service predominates a transaction often depends primarily on whether the
provider is a professional or commercial entity. Courts are far more likely to
consider professional services the essence of a transaction that also involves a
product transfer.0 7 Thus, although the In re Breast Implant court failed to

203. Id. (quoting I AMERICANLAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILiTY3D § 1:77, at 84 (Timothy
E. Travers et al. eds., 1987).

204. 258 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1969).
205. 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct., N.J. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Magrine v.
Spector, 241 A.2d 637 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968) (per curiam), aff'd, 250 A.2d 129 (N.J.

1969) (per curiam).
206. In reBreastImplant, 331 S.C. at 547,503 S.E.2d at 449 (."In general, the courts
have refused to apply the concept of strict liability in tort to a person rendering professional or
nonprofessional services, where injury occurs through a defective product used by the person
rendering such services, or as a result of allegedly defective services themselves."') (quoting I
AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3D, supra note 203, § 1:77, at 84).
207. See KEETON ET AL., supranote 2, § 104, at 720, in which the authors explained:
[D]rawing the line between professional and
nonprofessional services is not always easy and
perhaps in the final analysis the real question is
whether or not the service provider is the kind of
enterpriser who ought in the public interest to be
strictly accountable for harm resulting from the
defects in things transmitted in the course of
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acknowledge a distinction between the treatment, of professionals and
nonprofessionals in the hybrid transaction context, a distinction nevertheless
exists. Perhaps often unknowingly, courts tend to weigh the service side of the
Essence Test balance more heavily when the case involves a professional.
The court listed cases following the majority rule and briefly summarized
their holdings.20 8 Other than quoting the cases on which it relied, the court
addressed none of the policy arguments against applying strict products liability
to health care providers. The four cases that received the most attention from
the court are Hector v. Cedars-SinaiMedical Center,2"9 Cafazzo v. Central
MedicalHealth Services, Inc.,210 Ayyash v. Henry FordHealth Systems,"' and
Porterv. Rosenberg.2 The court cited these cases primarily to show how these
courts applied the Essence Test to medical treatment involving the use or
transfer of a defective product, 1 3 although the court also cited Cafazzo to refute
the plaintiffs' claims that health care providers are sellers because they charge
separately for the implants, often at a significant mark-up." 4 The court also
cited Ayyash, but for more than its Essence Test results. The South Carolina
Supreme Court made one of its few references to policy considerations by
paraphrasing the Ayyash court's reasoning as follows:
[B]ecause the primary function of physicians and hospitals is
to provide care, not to manufacture or distribute products,
those economic theories that underlie the imposition of strict
liability upon makers and sellers of products (e.g. spreading
the risk, redistribution of wealth, and problems of proof and
deterrence) do not justify the extension of strict liability to
medical service providers.2 5
The court implicitly rejected the reasoning in the South Carolina Trial Lawyers
Association's amicusbriefonbehalf ofthe plaintiffs, which consistedprimarily
of arguments against this contention.2" 6 Understandably, the court focusedmore
on the weight of relevant authority from other jurisdictions, the vast majority
of which supports its decision.

rendering services.
208. See In re Breast Implant, 331 S.C. at 547-50, 503 S.E.2d at 449-50.
209. 225 Cal. Rptr. 595 (Ct. App. 1986).
210. 668 A.2d 521 (Pa. 1995).
211. 533 N.W.2d 353 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
212. 650 So. 2d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
213. In re Breast Implant, 331 S.C. at 548, 503 S.E.2d at 449-50.
214. See id. at 548, 503 S.E.2d at 449. The Cafazzo court held that "separate
consideration" is simply irrelevant to the outcome ofthe Essence Test. Cafazzo, 668 A.2d at 524.
215. In re BreastImplant, 331 S.C. at 548, 503 S.E.2d at 449.
216. See Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted on Behalf of the South Carolina Trial
Lawyers Association at 13-20.
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4. No DistinctionBetween Implants and Instruments
Citing Magrine v. Krasnica2 7 and several other cases involving
instruments used during treatment alongside transferred device and implant
cases, the court never acknowledged a distinction between used and transferred
defective products. In fact, the court went to lengths to stretch the concept of
"used" products to include devices that actually leave the hospital in the
patient's physical possession. This Procrustean endeavor even appears in the
court's phrasing of the issue: "May a health care provider be held strictly liable
under S.C. Code Ann. § 15-73-10 for a medical device or instrument used in
the course of treating a patient?"' The court likewise carefully equated
medical devices and instruments throughout.
The idea that a court should hold a health care provider strictly liable for
a defective product merely used during treatment-a product for which the
patient did not bargain and which did not leave the hospital in the patient's
possession-is inherently suspect. By implicitly equating incidental use with
implantation, the court suggests that the idea that implants are sold during
breast augmentation surgery is just as ridiculous as the concept that a scalpel
merely used during surgery is sold to the patient.2" 9 In sharp contrast, comment
d to section 20 of the proposed final draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability provides a clear explanation of the distinction between
implanted and incidentally used devices:
"[S]ale-service hybrid transactions". . . tend to fall into two
categories. In the first, the product component is consumed in
the course ofproviding the service, as when a hair dye is used
in treating a customer's hair in a salon. Even when the service
provider does not charge the customer separately for the dye,
the transaction ordinarily is treated as a sale of the material
that is consumed in providing the service. When the product
component in the sale-service transaction is not consumed or
permanently transferred to the customer-as when defective
scissors are used in the hair salon-the transaction ordinarily
is treated as one not involving a sale of the product to the

217. 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct., N.J. 1967), aff'd sub nonm. Magrine v.
Spector, 241 A.2d 637 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968) (per curiam), aft'd,250 A.2d 129 (1969)
(per curiam).
218. In re Breast Implant, 331 S.C. at 544, 503 S.E.2d at 447 (emphasis added).

219. Though a few courts have held service providers strictly liable for used, nontransferred products, such decisions are both anomalous and insupportable. See, e.g., Skelton v.
Druid City Hosp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818, 823 (Ala. 1984) (reversing summary judgment for the
hospital on an implied warranty claim involving a defective suturing needle because a hospital
is a "merchant" under the Uniform Commercial Code).
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customer.22 °
The comment goes on to explain, with a tone that belies the drafters'
recognition of a double standard, that "[i]t should be noted that, in a strong
majority of jurisdictions, hospitals are held not to be sellers of products they
supply in connection with the provision of medical care, regardless of the
circumstances.,22' This testament to the preferential treatment that hospitals,
and possibly doctors, receive shows that while the undeniable distinction
between used and transferred products is significant in determining liability
relating to most hybrid transactions, courts simply ignore the distinction when
hospitals are involved. Liability will be denied regardless of the circumstances.
5. No Distinction Between Cosmetic and Medically Necessary
Products
The In re Breast Implant court used Weissman v. Dow Corning Corp.,'
also a breast implant case, to assert that no difference between medically
necessary treatment and elective cosmetic procedures exists.2' No doubt wary
of the difficulty of distinguishing between the two types of procedures in some
instances, the court summarily refused to impute any significance to the
patient's reason for undergoing treatment. 224 But because the court never relied
on the policy argument that health care providers should not be held strictly
liable due to the necessity of the services they provide, its refusal to recognize
the cosmetic/medically-necessary distinction fails to stand out as a weak point
in its rationale.
6. Holding as to Strict Liability in Tort Determines Warranty
Holding
As noted above, when a plaintiff asserts both strict liability in tort and
breach of warranty, courts almost always decide both claims the same way
because the two theories share the same governing principles.225 The In re
BreastImplant court followed suit, finding that its conclusion that "health care
providers offer services, not products" determined its holding as to the warranty
claims under Article II of the U.C.C. 226 To hold Healthcare Defendants liable
under breach of warranty while finding them exempt from strict tort liability
would go against the overwhelming weight of authority that essentially equates
220. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcTS LIABILITY

§ 20 cmt. d (Proposed

Final Draft 1997).
221. Id. (emphasis added).

222. 892 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
223. See In re Breast Implant, 331 S.C. at 549, 503 S.E.2d at 450.
224. See id.

225. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
226. In re Breast Implant, 331 S.C. at 553, 503 S.E.2d at 452.
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strict liability in tort to U.C.C. warranty claims.227
C. Implications ofandJustificationsfor the South CarolinaDecision
With In reBreastImplant,South Carolinajoins the majority in refusing to
impose strict products liability on health care providers for defective products
used or transferred during treatment. Quite understandably, the court relied on
the weight of relevant precedent from other jurisdictions.228 Because those
jurisdictions also adopted section 402A nearly verbatim, their interpretations
of their own strict tort liability statutes are relevant to South Carolina's
interpretation of section 15-73-10.2 9 Further, majority rule proponents have
provided persuasive responses to minority-rule policy arguments, which,
although largely unmentioned in In reBreastImplant, nevertheless charge the
opinion. So why does a reader of the opinion feel as though the court pulled
one over on the plaintiffs? The answer is simple: the court relied on the
Essence Test, the outcome of which can only be a legal fiction in the context
of surgically implanted devices.
The court's Essence Test results stem from the court's failure to make
several key distinctions. The court simplified the problem in order to provide
a simple answer. For example, even before any questions came to the court, the
court merged hospitals and doctors into one group, Healthcare Defendants,
though hospitals and physicians have differing roles in breast implant selection
and provision and different interests to protect. The court also blurred two other
boundary lines, the line separating instruments from transferred devices and the
line differentiating cosmetic procedures from medically necessary surgery.
The court's failure to acknowledge key distinctions weakened the
foundation of the decision by rendering it overwhelmingly broad. This
obfuscation expedited the court's adoption of the majority rule, a rule that
makes sense regarding instruments and perhaps even medically necessary
transferred devices, but that lacks justification regarding implanted cosmetic
products. Despite such distinctions, the court implicitly equated marketed,
cosmetic breast implants, which are transferred to a patient at a significant
markup, with a defective hypodermic needle merely used and discarded in the
course of medically necessary treatment.
Despite the court's blurring of several key dichotomies, one distinction
remains clear-the professional/commercial distinction. Though the court
neither overtly distinguished nor equated professional and commercial services,
the court implicitly condoned their segregation by applying the Essence Test,

227. The court concluded this section of the opinion by dismissing the plaintiffs'
claim forbreach ofa common lawwarranty ofsoundness and quality because the plaintiffs cited
no South Carolina cases recognizing such a warranty in the context of medicine, and the court
was aware of no such authority. Id.
228. See id. at 547-50, 503 S.E.2d at 449-50.
229. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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the outcome of which so often rests on the professional/commercial distinction.
As mentioned above, courts are simply more likely to hold services that are
professional, rather than commercial, as predominate in hybrid transactions."
If the court had made some of the distinctions mentioned above, it would
have also had to decide how to distinguish between products that health care
providers "sell" and those they do not, no doubt a formidable task.2 1 But by
limiting its opinion to a string citation of majority rule cases and a quick
application of the Essence Test, the court avoided some of the stickier
questions underlying the outdated predominant-factor formula. This Note has
analyzed the policy arguments on both sides of the issue and has shown that
both minority rule and majority rule proponents make compelling claims.
However, despite all the persuasive minority rule arguments, the majority rule
position that public policy demands the preservation of accessible medical
treatment remains valid. A large majority of courts has decided that satisfying
some plaintiffs is simply not worth the perceived risk of jeopardizing the
availability of medical services. Although no one can reliably predict how
widespread adoption of the minority rule would affect the availability of
medical services, the "preserving availability" argument cannot be
dismissed-it must be weighed against minority rule arguments. However, by
focusing on the essence of the transaction, courts have avoided this impossible
balancing test. At any rate, regardless of whether the majority position is the
"best" approach, courts unfortunately feel compelled to resort to legal fiction
either to promote or to renounce it.2
VI. CONCLUSION

One commentator believes the majority rule pervades simply because "the
law has not caught up with th[e] transformation in the health care field"
through which the implantation of medical devices has become increasingly
common.2 This statement could be based on the hope that once courts realize
the proliferation of these devices and the implications of denying an increasing
number of plaintiffs this avenue of recovery, they will "modernize" their view
of health care providers and treat them as the commercial entities they have
become. However, courts do not apply the Essence Test in favor of health care
providers because they do not understand the transferred nature of some
medical devices; they apply it in order to justify, however illogically, doing

230. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
232. Even the court in the leading minority rule case, Bell v. PoplarBluffPhysicians
Group, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994), relied on the Essence Test for its ruling. See
supra note 107 and accompanying text.
233. Adler, supra note 12, at 96.
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what they think will help preserve the availability of medical services. 3 1 This
justification apparently rests on the notion that the needs of a relatively small
class of plaintiffs that cannot recover from bankrupt manufacturers are
subordinate to the universal need for accessible health care.23 5 While this
argument is entirely defensible, courts should be able to further the argument's
goal without relying on a logical fallacy.
Perhaps the above commentator's statement about the law's lag behind
technology should be directed not at our courts, but at our legislatures. As the
court in Hoven v. Kelble' 6 recognized, "[b]ecause of the unknown costs and
the inability to assess the results" of imposing strict liability on the medical
profession, the issue could be better addressed by the state legislature or private
groups.' 37 If legislatures adopted laws either expressly exempting health care

234. See Poppell, supra note 98, at 300. Poppell states:
[Tihe basic arguments for an exemption from strict
liability for medical professionals boil down to two
considerations: (1) there are situations in which
medical professionals are using tools in rendering
their services and it is felt that Section 402A should
not apply since there is no clear transfer, and thus the
medical professional cannot be clearly said to be a
supplier of such products; (2) there may be other
situations in which there is a clear transfer of a
product from the medical professional to the patient,
but Section 402A should not apply because of fears
related to the costs, availability, and quality of
medical care. In order to avoid arguing these
conclusions strictly on policy grounds, the courts
often resort to deciding that there is no "sale"
involved between patient and doctor because the
essence of the transactionis services-oriented.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
235. See Ayyash v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 533 N.W.2d 353, 355 (Mich. Ct. App.
1995). In Ayysh the court stated:
It is reasonable to conclude that the vast majority of
patients would bear the increased costs associated
with such an impractical imposition of liability upon
the medical profession for the benefit of a few who
for some reason (here bankruptcy) may not be able to
obtain recovery from the manufacturer of the
defective product .... [T]his Court should not and

will not let its compassion in this case persuade it to
adopt a rule of law that would likely cause greater
long-term harm to more patients and the medical
profession by an ill-advised adoption ofstrict liability
against health care providers."
Id. at 355-56.
236. 256 N.W.2d 379 (Wis. 1977).
237. Id. at 392; see Christopher L. Thompson, Note, Imposing Strict Products
Liabilityon MedicalCareProviders, 60 Mo. L.Rv. 711,716 (1995) (citingHoven, 256 N.W.2d
at 393).
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providers from or including them within the scope of strict products liability in
the context of sales-service transactions, courts would no longer need to resort
to strained applications of the Essence Test.
The case of strict products liability for medical instruments and devices
mirrors the "bad blood" cases that inspired almost every jurisdiction to enact
blood shield statutes.23 As technology advances and the use of transferred
medical devices increases, the instances of defective devices will no doubt soon
approach the number of incidents involving defective blood. Courts need an
updated method of resolving future strict liability claims against health care
providers-something concrete rather than a test that so often results in legal
fiction. If our legislatures share the underlying theory of majority rule
courts-that we must exempt health care providers from strict liability to
preserve the availability of medical services-they should give courts a reliable
tool with which to implement that theory.

9

Until our legislatures decide,

courts will persist in clinging to fallacious applications of the Essence Test to
find some non-policy justification for immunizing health care providers from
strict liability for medical devices.
Laura Pleicones

238. See discussion supraPart V.B.1.
239. But see Adler, supra note 12, at 123-24. Adler critically notes that because of
blood shield statutes, "[c]ourts no longer have to awkwardly debate whether a sale of blood is
occurring or if a hospital is a seller of blood. In regard to blood... the legislatures have done
the work for them." Id. While this author sees legislative action as a potentially positive solution
for medical devices as well as for blood, Adler "offers the blood case history as a contrastto
possible future treatment of surgical implants" and "as a warning as well." Id. at 124.
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